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There are many reasons we might want to take the opinions of various individuals
and aggregate them to give the opinions of the group they constitute. If all the individu-
als in the group have probabilistic opinions about the same propositions, there is a host
of aggregation functions we might deploy, such as linear or geometric pooling. However,
there are also cases where different members of the group assign probabilities to different
sets of propositions, which might overlap a lot, a little, or not at all. There are far fewer
proposals for how to proceed in these cases, and those there are have undesirable fea-
tures. I begin by considering four proposals and arguing that they don’t work; then I’ll
describe my own proposal. In fact, my proposal breaks down into two proposals, each
suited to a different purpose we might have when we aggregate. One purpose is descrip-
tive, the other normative. In descriptive cases, we aggregate the individuals’ credences
in order to provide a compressed summary description of their opinions; in normative
cases, we aggregate the credences to provide an account of the group’s opinion, where
the group is in some sense treated as an entity in its own rights.
1 Introduction
There are many reasons we might want to take the opinions of various individuals and ag-
gregate them to give the opinions of the group they constitute. They might be demographic
modellers, and we wish to summarise their views for policymakers. Or they might be ice
sheet modellers and we wish to aggregate the probabilities they assign to various future sea
level scenarios in order to include these in our global climate models (Bamber & Aspinall,
2013; Bamber et al., 2019). We might be producing a textbook on the epidemiology of respi-
ratory viruses, and we wish to present something that we might legitimately call the view of
the scientific community (French, 1987, 2011). Or we might be the lead author on a scientific
paper with many co-authors and we wish to ensure that the conclusions presented in the pa-
per are genuinely those of the entire group of authors (Bright et al., 2017). Outside science,
the individuals we wish to aggregate might be employees of a company or institution whose
collective opinion we wish to assess in order to determine liability for some harm, such as
the board members of tobacco, oil, or social media companies, or the senior management
of a police force (Lackey, 2020). Or they might be superforecasters, renowned for the accu-
racy of their previous predictions of future political or sporting events, and we wish to learn
what they, as a group, think about a forthcoming election or the future state of democratic
institutions in a country (Tetlock & Gardner, 2015). And so on.
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If all the individuals in the group have probabilistic opinions about the same proposi-
tions, there is a host of aggregation functions we might deploy. For instance, linear pooling
takes the group’s probability for a proposition to be the arithmetic mean of the probabili-
ties that its members assign to that proposition. Or, to calculate the group’s probabilities
for the possible states of the world, geometric pooling takes, for each state, the geometric
mean of the probabilities that its members assign to that state, and then normalizes the re-
sults to ensure the pooled probabilities for the possible states sum to one. And so on. Each
of these methods has its own desirable and undesirable features, which have been explored
extensively (Genest & Zidek, 1986; Dietrich & List, 2015).
However, there are also cases where different members of the group assign probabilities
to different sets of propositions, which might overlap a lot, a little, or not at all. Indeed,
unless the probabilities are elicited by asking the same roster of questions to each individual
in the group, this is the most likely situation we encounter in the wild. For instance, if we
learn the probabilities that the members of a group of superforecasters assign by looking at
their betting behaviour in a prediction market, any individual will likely have entered bets
on some propositions that others have ignored, and failed to enter bets on some propositions
that others have considered. One might have considered the proposition that Apple’s stock
price will rise and the proposition that Microsoft’s will, but not the proposition that Apple’s
will rise more than Microsoft’s, while another considered Microsoft’s stock price and the
comparison with Apple, but not Apple’s stock price (Osherson & Vardi, 2006). And if we
glean the probabilities that academic experts in an area assign by looking at what they report
in their scholarly publications, we will find the same thing: probabilities reported for some
propositions, but not others. One climate scientist might assign a probability to sea levels
rising by at least 60cm by 2100, but nothing more fine-grained, while another might assign
probabilities to it rising by 60-80cm, 80-100cm, and more than 100cm by that date. As they
are usually formulated, most aggregation functions don’t cover these cases. In this paper, I
explore how we might fill that gap.
In Section 2, I’ll introduce the formal framework in which we’ll explore our problem. In
Sections 3-7, I’ll consider four proposals and argue that they don’t work. Some of these exist
in the literature explicitly as an answer to our question; some exist as answers to different
questions, but are naturally repurposed to address ours; and some are simply occur to us
naturally when we consider the question. Because there is so little written on this question,
I begin with these four unsatisfactory proposals partly in order to clear the ground. But we
will also see that, by doing so, an alternative proposal suggests itself. In fact, two proposals
suggest themselves, each suited to a different purpose we might have when we aggregate.
One purpose is descriptive, the other normative. In descriptive cases, we aggregate the indi-
viduals’ credences in order to provide a compressed summary description of their opinions.
I treat these sorts of case in Section 9.1. In normative cases, we aggregate the credences to
provide an account of the group’s opinion, where the group is in some sense treated as an
entity in its own rights. I treat these sorts of case in Section 9.2.
2 The formal framework
Let me begin by laying out the formal framework we’ll be working within.
• Individuals Let’s assume that there are n individuals whose opinions we wish to ag-
gregate.
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• Propositions Let Fi be the set of propositions to which individual i assigns subjective
probabilities or degrees of belief, which we will call credences throughout. We might
call Fi their agenda or opinion set. Let F =
⋃n
i=1 Fi be the union of all the individuals’
agendas. Throughout, we assume that each Fi is finite, and therefore F is finite too.
• Possible states of the world LetW be the set of possible worlds grained just finely enough
to assign truth values to each proposition in F . We might represent W as the set of
classically consistent assignments of truth values to the propositions in F . Since each
Fi is finite and therefore F is finite,W is also finite. If a proposition X in F is true at
world w inW , we write w |= X.
• Subjective probabilities/credences Let Pi record the credences that individual i assigns to
the propositions in Fi. We’ll call this their credence function. For X in Fi, Pi(X) is the
credence that individual i assigns to X. It is at least 0 and at most 1. We assume that
these credences functions are coherent: that is, if F ∗i is the smallest Boolean algebra
that contains Fi, then it is possible to extend each Pi to a credence function P∗i on F ∗i
that satisfies the probability axioms—that is, P∗i assigns credence 1 to the tautology, 0
to the contradiction, and the credence it assigns to a finite disjunction of incompatible
propositions is the sum of the credences it assigns to the disjuncts.
• Aggregation functions An aggregation function ∆ takes a sequence of n credence func-
tions, P1, . . . , Pn, where Pi assigns credences to the propositions in Fi, and returns a
credence function ∆(P1, . . . , Pn), which assigns credences to the propositions in F =⋃n
i=1 Fi.
Existing accounts of judgment aggregation deal with the particular case in which F1 =
. . . = Fn = F . They often also assume that F is a Boolean algebra. In such cases, for
every world w in W , there is a proposition in F that is true at w and only at w—these are
sometimes called the atoms of the Boolean algebra F . We abuse notation and write w for that
proposition. We can then define linear and geometric pooling as follows:
Linear pooling For P1, . . . , Pn defined on the same agenda F , if X is in F , then







That is, the credence that the linear pool of P1, . . . , Pn assigns to a possible world
is the arithmetic mean of the credences that each Pi assigns to it.
Geometric pooling For P1, . . . , Pn defined on the same agenda F , which is a
Boolean algebra, if w is inW , then








And, for X in F ,
∆GP(P1, . . . , Pn)(X) = ∑
w|=X
∆GP(P1, . . . , Pn)(w)
That is, the credence that the geometric pool of P1, . . . , Pn assigns to a possible
world is the normalized geometric mean of the credences that each Pi assigns
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to it; and the credence it assigns to a proposition is the sum of the credences it
assigns to the worlds at which the proposition is true.
A few things to note:
• If each Pi is coherent, so is their linear pool.
• Whether or not each Pi is coherent, their geometric pool is coherent.
• Linear pooling is defined directly for each proposition in F ; as a result, we need not
assume that F is a Boolean algebra.
• Geometric pooling is defined first for the states of the world in W , and then for each
proposition in F ; as a result, we must assume that F is a Boolean algebra.
In this paper, we ask: how should we aggregate in other cases? That is, how should we
aggregate when two individuals have different agendas; that is, when Fi 6= Fj for some
individuals i and j?
In the following four sections, we consider different answers to this question. None
of them work. We consider them partly to situate our proposal within the literature and
clear the ground, but also because solving the problem that rules out the first two proposals
motivates the account that we will go on to give in the remainder of the paper. The third
proposal also attempts to solve that problem. It fails for a different reason, but one that is
equally illuminating. Those impatient to hear about our solution can skip to Section 9.
3 Extending linear and geometric pooling
As we saw in the previous section, linear and geometric pooling are only defined in the
special case in which F1 = . . . = Fn = F ; moreover, geometric pooling requires that F is a
Boolean algebra. But perhaps we might generalize them so that they apply when Fi 6= Fj
for some individuals i and j?
For instance, suppose {X, Y, Z} is a three-cell partition, and suppose the first of two in-
dividuals assigns credences to X, Y, and Z, so that F1 = {X, Y, Z}, while the second assigns
credences only to X and Y, so that F2 = {X, Y}. Suppose their probability assignments are
as follows:
X Y Z
P1 0.1 0.4 0.5
P2 0.2 0.6 −
Then extending linear pooling to this case and taking the arithmetic means of the credences
assigned to each gives:
X Y Z
∆LP′(P1, P2) 0.15 0.5 0.5
But that’s not coherent: the credences in X, Y, and Z sum to more than 1.
On the other hand, extending geometric pooling to this case and taking the geometric
mean of the probabilities assigned to X, Y, and Z, and then normalizing, gives:
X Y Z
∆GP′(P1, P2) 0.125 0.433 0.442
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Obviously that is coherent, because geometric pooling requires us to normalise the geometric
means; so the result will always be coherent.
Perhaps we should follow the lead of geometric pooling and do this for our extended
version of linear pooling in such cases as well? So first we take the arithmetic means, and
then we normalise the result. That would give:
X Y Z
∆LP′′(P1, P2) 0.1304 0.4347 0.4347
Unfortunately, both normalized extended linear pooling (∆LP′′) and extended geometric
pooling (∆GP′) violate a principle that I take to govern judgment aggregation in the cases we
are considering, where the agendas of some of our individuals differ.
Dimension Insensitivity (DI) If, for each individual i, there is a unique coherent
credence function P?i defined onF =
⋃n
i=1 Fi that extends Pi, then ∆(P1, . . . , Pn) =
∆(P?1 , . . . , P
?
n ).1
The point is well illustrated by the example we’ve been considering in this section. While
P2 does not assign a credence to Z, it does assign credences to X and Y and together those
determine the credence it would have to assign to Z in order to remain coherent—since X,
Y, Z form a partition, it must assign 0.2. Dimension Insensitivity (DI) says that, in cases like
this, where the probabilities that an individual assigns to the propositions in Fi determine
the probabilities they must assign to the remaining propositions in F , the result of aggre-
gating the original probability assignments on F1, . . . ,Fn should be the same as the result
of aggregating the probability functions on F that are obtained by filling in the gaps in the
way that coherence requires. The idea is that, if the credences you have reported commit
you to further credences, then adding those further credences explicitly shouldn’t change
the outcome of aggregating your credences with the credences of others. We will offer a
partial accuracy-based justification of the principle in Section 8 below.
Thus, return to our case above:
X Y Z
P1 0.3 0.4 0.3
P2 0.2 0.6 −
P?2 0.2 0.6 0.2
So (DI) says that ∆(P1, P2) = ∆(P1, P?2 ). But notice that neither normalized extended linear
pooling (∆LP′′) nor extended geometric pooling (∆GP′) deliver this:
X Y Z
∆LP′′(P1, P2) 0.1304 0.4347 0.4347
∆LP(P1, P?2 ) 0.15 0.5 0.35
∆GP′(P1, P2) 0.125 0.433 0.442
∆GP(P1, P?2 ) 0.149 0.517 0.333
(DI) will cause problems for the proposal we consider in the following section as well.
But before we move on to that, there is another problem with our attempt to extend linear
1P?i defined on F extends Pi defined on Fi ⊆ F if P
?
i (X) = Pi(X) for all X in Fi. That is, if the restriction of
P?i to Fi is just Pi.
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and geometric pooling to the case in which Fi 6= Fj for some i, j. Suppose F1 = {X ∨Y} and
F2 = {Y ∨ Z}, where again X, Y, and Z form a partition. And suppose P1 assigns credences
only to the proposition in F1, while P2 assigns only to the proposition in F2. In particular,
X ∨Y Y ∨ Z
P1 0.2 −
P2 − 0.3
Now, first try to apply the extended linear pooling operator, ∆LP′′ . By averaging the cre-
dences in each proposition, we get:
X ∨Y Y ∨ Z
∆LP′ 0.2 0.3
But that is incoherent: the credences in X ∨ Y and Y ∨ Z must sum at least to 1. So now
we need to normalize. But how to do this? To normalize a credence function, we need to
know the credences it assigns to the possible worlds. But in this case, we don’t know that.
So ∆LP′′(P1, P2) is undefined. And of course the same fate befalls ∆GP′(P1, P2): indeed, it can’t
even get started, since it is defined initially on possible worlds, and then only at the second
stage on logically weaker propositions.
4 A concern about Dimension Insensitivity
You might worry that it is not reasonable to demand that our aggregation rule satisfy (DI).
After all, it seems that there are cases in which, when an individual i comes to consider a
proposition to which they do not currently assign a credence, the process of considering it
and assigning it a credence leads them to change the credences they already assign. This
is the problem discusses in the literature on awareness growth (Karni & Vierø, 2013; Wen-
mackers & Romeijn, 2016; Bradley, 2017; Steele & Stefánsson, 2021; Mahtani, ta). A standard
example is when the individual becomes aware of a possibility that they hadn’t considered
before. For instance, I might assign credences only to the propositions It will rain tomorrow
and It will be sunny tomorrow, and assign credence 50% to each, but then come to consider
a third possibility, namely, It will be misty tomorrow; and that might lead me to reduce my
credence in the original two propositions in order to assign some credence to this new one.
I agree that this is possible and indeed rational. But it typically occurs when the individ-
ual learns a new concept or is made aware of a new possibility. In the sort of cases we’re
considering here this doesn’t happen. Our examples in the introduction involve aggregating
the opinions of reasonably cohesive collectives, such as the members of a scientific subdisci-
pline like glaciology or virology, or the executive employees of a corporation or institution.
In these cases, it is reasonable to assume that the individuals in question have a shared set of
concepts and a shared conception of the possibilities. So, when they do not assign a credence
to a proposition, it is not because the possibility identified by that proposition or the concepts
it contains would be entirely new to them. It is rather just that they are finite creatures, as we
all are, and do not always assign credences to all propositions that their conceptual scheme
determines. So, in the cases with which I am concerned here, it is reasonable to demand (DI).
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5 The Coherent Approximation Principle
In Section 3, we saw that it is difficult to extend linear and geometric pooling so that they
apply to the problem of aggregating credence functions defined on different agendas—that
is, when Fi 6= Fj for some i, j. In this section, we turn to one of the few treatments of the
current problem from the literature. It is due to Daniel Osherson and Moshe Vardi (Osherson
& Vardi, 2006).
In fact, Osherson and Vardi treat two problems at once. Not only do they not assume
that the individuals to be aggregated assign credences to the same propositions; they also do
not assume that those individuals assign coherent credences. So they seek an aggregation
function that takes possibly incoherent credence functions over possibly different agendas
and aggregates them into a coherent credence function on the union of the agendas. Their
approach, which draws on the pioneering work of Konieczny & Pino-Pérez (1998, 1999), is
distance-based. That is, we begin by identifying a measure of distance from one credence to
another. We then take the aggregate of a set of credence functions to be the credence function
for which the average of the sum of the distances from the credences that it assigns to the
credences that the individuals assign is minimal. Osherson and Vardi consider two such
measures of distance:
Absolute deviation For credences 0 ≤ p, q ≤ 1,
AD(p, q) = |p− q|
Squared deviation For credences 0 ≤ p, q ≤ 1,
SD(p, q) = |p− q|2
And there are many others, including the popular Kullback-Leibler divergence:
Kullback-Leibler divergence For credences 0 ≤ p, q ≤ 1,
KL(p, q) = p log
p
q
− p + q
We say that a measure d of distance from one credence to another is a divergence if (i) d(p, q) ≥
0 for all 0 ≤ p, q ≤ 1 and (ii) d(p, q) = 0 iff p = q. AD, SD, and KL are all divergences. Now,
given a divergence d, here is Osherson and Vardi’s aggregation function, where PF is the set
of coherent credence functions on F = ⋃ni=1 Fi:
Coherent Approximation Principled (CAPd) For Pi defined on Fi,








That is, ∆dCAP(P1, . . . , Pn) is the coherent credence function for which the average of the sums
of the divergences from its credences to the credences assigned by P1, . . . , Pn is minimal.
In fact, if we wish the minimizer to be unique here, we must restrict the divergences that
we use. For instance, recall our example from the previous section:
X Y Z
P1 0.1 0.4 0.5
P2 0.2 0.6 −
P?2 0.2 0.6 0.2
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Then, if we use the absolute deviation to measure the distance from one credence to another—
that is, if d = AD—then, providing 0.1 ≤ P(X) ≤ 0.2, 0.4 ≤ P(Y) ≤ 0.6, and 0.2 ≤ P(Z) ≤
0.5, P minimises the average distance to P1 and P?2 . I presume for this reason, when Osh-
erson writes about CAP again with different co-authors, they focus on squared deviation
(Predd et al., 2008). We’ll focus on squared deviation and Kullback-Leibler divergence for
the moment.2 Here are the results of aggregating P1 and P2 using ∆SDCAP and using ∆
KL
CAP, and
the results of aggregating P1 and P?2 using ∆
SD




∆SDCAP(P1, P2) 0.113 0.462 0.425
∆SDCAP(P1, P
?
2 ) 0.15 0.5 0.35
∆KLCAP(P1, P2) 0.32 0.204 0.475
∆KLCAP(P1, P
?
2 ) 0.148 0.389 0.463
Since the first and second row differ, ∆SDCAP violates (DI); since the third and fourth row differ,
∆KLCAP violates (DI).
Now, you might try to save the Coherent Approximation Principle in one of two ways.
First, you might seek a divergence d for which ∆dCAP satisfies (DI). However, the following
fact shows that this is impossible:
Proposition 1. If d is differentiable in its first argument, ∆dCAP violates (DI).
(The proof is given in the Appendix.)
Second, you might think that the problem arises because the single credence assigned to
Z is given exactly as much weight as the two credences assigned to X and the two credences
assigned to Y. But it’s easy to check that assigning twice as much weight to d(P(Z), P1(Z))
as to d(P(X), P1(X)) or d(P(Y), P1(Y)) doesn’t bring the Coherent Approximation Principle
into agreement with (DI). For instance,
(SD(P(X), 0.1) + SD(P(X), 0.2))+
(SD(P(Y), 0.4) + SD(P(Y), 0.6))+
2× SD(P(Z), 0.5)
is minimized among coherent functions at P = (0.1, 0.45, 0.45), while
(SD(P(X), 0.1) + SD(P(X), 0.2))+
(SD(P(Y), 0.4) + SD(P(Y), 0.6))+
(SD(P(Z), 0.5) + SD(P(Z), 0.2))
is minimized among coherent credence functions at P = (0.15, 0.5, 0.35).
We will return to (DI) below. So far, we have appealed only to its intuitive plausibility.
In Section 8, we will compare the accuracy of the credences you obtain if you use it with the
accuracy of the credences you obtain if you violate it in various ways.
2Pettigrew (2019) makes the same choice.
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6 Aggregating the sets of coherent credence functions that extend
the individuals’ credence functions
Like the Coherent Approximation Principle, the third proposal we’ll consider asks us to
aggregate by minimizing the average distance from some representation of the individuals’
opinions. But whereas CAP represents individual i by the precise credences they assign to
the propositions in Fi, the third proposal represents them by the imprecise credences they
assign to the propositions in F . That is, instead of representing individual i by the single
credence function Pi, which is defined on Fi, we represent them by the following set of credence
functions, which are defined on F , where PF is the set of coherent credence functions on F ,
as above:
Ri = {P : F → [0, 1] | P ∈ PF & (∀X ∈ Fi)[P(X) = Pi(X)]}
So, Ri is the set of coherent extensions of Pi toF . And we aggregate P1, . . . , Pn by aggregating
R1, . . . , Rn. And we aggregate R1, . . . , Rn by finding a credence function P that minimizes
the average distance from P to the Ris, where the distance from P to Ri is the minimum
distance between P and a member of Ri. For many divergences and many P1, . . . , Pn, this
minimization problem will have a unique solution. In that case, we define:












I call this aggregation function ∆dMW, because this method for aggregating sets of proba-
bility functions is proposed by Martin Adamčı́k and George Wilmers (Adamčı́k & Wilmers,
2014; Wilmers, 2015). Seamus Bradley (2019) criticizes it as an aggregation rule for sets of
probability functions that represent uncertainty in the imprecise credence framework. But
his criticisms are less worrying when it is used to aggregate sets of probability functions that
represent gaps in credal reporting, as we do here, so I won’t repeat them.
It is easy to see that such an aggregation function will satisfy (DI). After all, if there is a
unique coherent credence function P?i , defined on F , that extends Pi, which is defined on Fi,
then the set of coherent probability functions that extends Pi is the same as the set of coherent
probability functions that extends P?i —both contain only P
?
i . That is:
Ri = {P : F → [0, 1] | P ∈ PF & (∀X ∈ Fi)[P(X) = Pi(X)]} =
{P?i } = {P : F → [0, 1] | P ∈ PF & (∀X ∈ Fi)[P(X) = P?i (X)]} = R?i
So this proposal does not suffer from the same problem as the previous two. But it does
face a problem: it gives implausible answers in reasonably straightforward cases. For in-
stance, suppose F = {X, Y, Z}, where X, Y, and Z form a partition, and F1 = {X} and
F2 = {Y}. And suppose
X Y Z
P1 0.8 − −
P2 − 0.8 −
So:
• R1 = {P ∈ PF : P(X) = 0.8}
• R2 = {P ∈ PF : P(Y) = 0.8}
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X = (1, 0, 0) Y = (0, 1, 0)







Figure 1: The barycentric plot of the 2-simplex with (1, 0, 0) at bottom left, (0, 1, 0) at bottom
right, and (0, 0, 1) at the top. The dotted lines represent R1 and R2, respectively. And the
result of applying ∆dMW to P1 and P2 is plotted.
We can illustrate these two sets of probabilities by plotting them within the three-dimensional
simplex on a barycentric plot (see Figure 1). The problem is that, if d is squared deviation
(SD) or Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL), then ∆dCAP(P1, P2) is as follows:
X Y Z
∆dMW(P1, P2) 0.5 0.5 0
That is plotted on the simplex as well. The problem here is that this seems too extreme: it
assigns no probability to Z, even though nothing in the opinions of either agent forces that.
It is the same aggregate we would obtain if both agents were to assign zero credence to Z
and fill in Y in such a way that they remained coherent. That is,









P◦1 0.8 0.2 0
P◦2 0.2 0.8 0
7 Maximising entropy within the set of possible aggregates
Another proposal that arises naturally. Let
RLP = {∆LP(P′1, . . . , P′n) : P′i ∈ Ri}
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That is, RLP is the set of linear pools of coherent extensions of the individuals’ credence
functions. Then let the aggregate of P1, . . . , Pn be the credence function in RLP with maximum
entropy.3 First, define the Shannon entropy of a probability function P defined over a setW
of possible worlds as follows:




∆LPME(P1, . . . , Pn) := arg max
P∈RLP
H(P)
The problem with this approach is that, again, it gives an implausible answer in the case we
considered in the previous section. But this time it gives exactly the opposite implausible
answer to the one above! Suppose
X Y Z
P1 0.8 − −
P2 − 0.8 −
Then
X Y Z
∆LPME(P1, P2) 0.4 0.4 0.2
Again, we illustrate this in a barycentric plot—see Figure 2.
The problem again is that this seems too extreme, albeit extreme in the opposite direction:
it is the same aggregate we would obtain if the first agent were to assign zero credence to Y
and the second were to assign zero credence to X.
8 On the accuracy of aggregation rules
In Sections 3 and 5, we criticized the extensions of linear and geometric pooling, ∆LP′′ and
∆GP′ , and the Coherent Approximation Principle, ∆
d
CAP, because they both violate (DI), the
principle that says that, when there’s a unique coherent extension of each credence function
to the full algebra, aggregating those extensions should give the same result as aggregating
the original credence functions. At that point, I merely appealed to the intuitive force of
(DI)—I gave no further argument in its favour. But there is something to be said for aggre-
gation rules that satisfy it, at least when they are compared with CAP.
Let’s begin with a slight adaptation of the simple example from above:
X Y Z
P1 0.1 0.4 −
P2 0.2 0.6 −
P?1 0.1 0.4 0.5
P?2 0.2 0.6 0.2
3Strictly speaking, this will only work if F = ⋃ni=1 Fi contains W . It’s an interesting question how the
proposal might be extended beyond this, perhaps by considering the extensions of each Pi not only to F but
to F ∗, the smallest Boolean algebra that contains F . But, as we will see, the proposal doesn’t work, so I won’t
spend time on that.
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X = (1, 0, 0) Y = (0, 1, 0)





(0, 0.8, 0.2)∆LPME(P1, P2)
Figure 2: The barycentric plot of the 2-simplex with (1, 0, 0) at bottom left, (0, 1, 0) at bottom
right, and (0, 0, 1) at the top. The dotted lines represent R1 and R2, respectively. And the
result of applying ∆LPME to P1 and P2 is plotted.
(DI) says that aggregating P1 and P2 should give the same result as aggregating P1 and P?2 ,
which should give the same result as aggregating P?1 and P2, which should give the same
result as aggregating P?1 and P
?
2 . That is, if ∆ is our aggregation function,
∆(P1, P2) = ∆(P1, P?2 ) = ∆(P
?
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That is, when we include the credal assignment to Z that P1 determines, but not the as-
signment that P2 determines, ∆SDCAP pulls the aggregate towards P1 and away from P2; and,
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mutatis mutandis, if we include the credal assignment to Z that P2 determines, but not the
one that P1 determines. And, moreover, the pull is the same but in opposite directions in the
two cases. So, when we average them, we obtain what we would have obtained if we’d left
out both assignments to Z (and aggregated P1 and P2) or if we’d included both assignments
to Z (and aggregated P?1 and P
?
2 ).
What does this tell us? Well, suppose our favoured aggregation function for those cases
in which all individuals have the same opinion set (or agenda) is linear pooling; and sup-
pose we extend that aggregation function in line with (DI). Then we can say that following
in favour of our approach and against CAP. First, we note the following corollary of the
Diversity Prediction Theorem (Galton, 1907; Page, 2007):
Theorem 2. For any F and credence functions Q, Q1, . . . , Qn defined on F ,
∑
X∈F









This says that, for any credence function Q and any set of credence functions Q1, . . . , Qn all
defined on the same set of propositions, the distance of the linear pool of Q1, . . . , Qn from
Q is always less than the average distance of the Qis from Q, when the distance between
credences is measured using squared deviation.4
How does this help? Well, given a possible world w, let Vw be the credence function that
assigns maximal credence to all propositions that are true at w and minimal credence to all
propositions that are false at w: that is, Vw(X) = 1 if X is true at w, and Vw(X) = 0 if X
is false at w. We might call Vw the omniscient credence function. It is natural to say that
the ideal credence function for an individual to have at a world is the omniscient credence
function at that world, and that a credence function is more accurate the closer it lies to that
omniscient credence function. So we might say that the inaccuracy of a credence function
Qi at world w is the sum of the squared deviations between the credences it assigns and the
credences that Vw assigns: we call this the Brier score of inaccuracy. So, if P is defined on F ,
B(P, w) = ∑
X∈F
(P(X)−Vw(X))2
And we might think that a credence function is doing better, epistemically speaking, the
greater its inaccuracy and the lower its Brier score. That is, P is better than Q at w just in case
B(P, w) < B(Q, w) (Brier, 1950; Pettigrew, 2016). Then, by Theorem 2,
Corollary 3. For any F , any world w, and any credence functions Q1, . . . , Qn defined on F ,







That is, the inaccuracy of the linear pool of Q1, . . . , Qn is less than the average inaccuracy of
the Qis.















is just ∆LP(P?1 , P
?




2 ) at that
4Indeed, this generalizes to any convex divergence, but I’ll focus on squared deviation here for the sake of
concreteness.
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1 , P2) at that world. That is,
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So aggregating in line with (DI) is more accurate than aggregating in line with CAP, at
least in expectation and if you are equally likely to find yourself aggregating P1 and P2 as
you are to find yourself aggregating P1 and P?2 , or P
?





Does this generalise beyond the specific case of P1 and P2? Yes, as the following theorem
shows:
Theorem 4. Suppose F ,F ′ are two sets of propositions and F ′ ⊆ F . Suppose P1 is a credence
function on F ′ and P?1 is the unique coherent extension of P1 to F ′; and suppose P2 is a credence























Now, suppose you enter an aggregation task knowing only that the individuals will as-
sign credences either to the propositions in F ′ or to the propositions in F , where F ′ ⊆ F .
Then, if we assume that there is no correlation between the particular credences the individu-
als assign and whether they assign them only to the propositions in F ′ or to the propositions
in F , then it is as likely that the group you wish to aggregate consists of P1 and P?2 as it is
that it will consist of P?1 and P2, and as likely that it consists of P1 and P2, and as likely that
it consists of P?1 and P
?
2 . And if that’s right then the expected inaccuracy of using a rule that
respects (DI) and thus sets ∆(P?1 , P2) = ∆(P1, P
?




2 ) is lower than the expected













2 ) a probability of 25%.
9 Beyond Dimension Insensitivity
Dimension Insensitivity tells us how our aggregation function should work when, for each
individual i, there is a unique coherent extension P?i of Pi from Fi to F—that is, when each
set Ri, which contains all the coherent extensions of Pi fromFi toF , is just the singleton {P?i }.
In such a case, (DI) tell us, you pick the aggregation function you favour for those cases in
which F1 = . . . = Fn, and you apply it to the extended credence functions P?1 , . . . , P?n , which
are all defined on F .
As it stands, however, (DI) does not tell us how to proceed when, for some individual
i, there is more than one coherent credence function that extends Pi from Fi to F—that is,
when some Ri contains more than one credence function. As we will see, in such cases,
how we should proceed depends on the purpose for which we are aggregating the indi-
viduals’ opinions. These purposes can be divided, very roughly, into two sets, which we
might describe as descriptive and normative. In descriptive cases, we aggregate the individu-
als’ credences in order to provide a compressed summary description of their opinions. It is
a situation in which we might be better served by simply providing a compendium of all the
individuals’ credences. However, because of constraints either on the time we have available
to present their opinions, or on the storage space of whatever device we use to record them,
or on the attention span or cognitive power of the person receiving the information, we need
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a summary. I treat this case in Section 9.1. In normative cases, we aggregate the credences
not so much to provide a compressed description of the individual members’ descriptions,
but rather to provide an account of the group’s opinion, where the group is in some sense
treated as an entity in its own rights. I treat this case in Section 9.2.
9.1 Aggregating credences for descriptive purposes
Let’s begin with the descriptive aim of aggregating credences. From the examples given in
the introduction, these are the ones I envisage falling into this categories: the demographic
modellers whose views we wish to summarise for policymakers; the ice sheet experts whose
credences we wish to combine to provide the probabilities for different sea level rises we
will use in our models of the whole Earth system; the superforecasters whose opinions we
wish to aggregrate to inform give our own opinions and decision-making. In each of these
cases, we essentially use the individuals in these groups as a sort of instrument or measuring
device to provide information about the world.
There are then two sorts of case: either each individual in fact assigns credences to all of
the propositions inF , but for each individual i, we only know the credence they assign to the
propositions in Fi; or each individual i genuinely only assigns credences to the propositions
in Fi. In the former case, the credences we seek exist, but we don’t know what they are;
in the latter case, they do not exist, but we might suppose that there is some determinate
fact about what they would be were each individual to consider all the propositions in F and
assign credences to them.
In either case, the problem is simply a particular case of a standard problem, namely,
how to estimate a quantity. In the first case, each individual assigns credences to all the
propositions in F , but we don’t know all of them. So the linear pool and geometric pool
and other aggregates of those credence functions over F are determined, but we don’t know
what they are. So we place a probability function over the possible values it might take in a
way that captures our uncertainty about it, and we take the expected value of these possible
aggregates to be the aggregate credence we report. In the second case, each individual as-
signs credences only to the propositions in Fi, but there is some determinate fact about what
credence they would assign to the remaining propositions in F were they to consider them. So,
again, the linear pool and geometric pool and other aggregates of those credence functions
over F are determined, but we don’t know what they are. So, again, we place a probability
function over the possible values it might take in a way that captures our uncertainty about
it, and we take the expected value of these possible aggregates to be the aggregate credence
we report.
9.2 Aggregating credences for normative purposes
Let’s turn next to the more difficult case in which we aggregate not because we think of the
individuals as instruments from which we can learn about the world, but because the group
to which they belong plays a role in some normative enterprise and we wish to discover what
that group thinks for that normative purpose. From the examples given in the introduction,
these are the ones I envisage falling into this category: the epidemiologists of viruses whose
views we wish to present as the view of the scientific community in our textbooks; the co-
authors on a multi-authored scientific paper whose aggregate view as a collective author we
wish to present to the scientific community; and the employees of a company or institution
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whose collective view we wish to identify in order to assess liability for some harm. In the
first two cases, the normative enterprise in which the groups play are role is the enterprise
of science, which has norms that govern the assertions included in textbooks and scientific
papers. In the third case, the normative enterprise is the legal system, and there are norms
here that govern the beliefs we ascribe to an individual whose liability for some harm we are
assessing.
While these normative enterprises and the roles within them that the groups play are
quite different, a similar norm governs how we should extend each individual i’s credences
from Fi to F . It is a conservative norm. It says that we should extend them in the most
conservative and unopinionated way possible. That is, we should introduce as little in the
way of further opinions as we can when we extend.
Why is this the appropriate norm in the scientific case? In fact, I think there are two
reasons. The first reason is the duty of the textbook’s author or the paper’s lead author to
represent fairly the views of the individuals on behalf of whom they write. The textbook’s
author presents the views of that part of the scientific community; the lead author presents
the views of their fellow co-authors. In both cases, they have a duty not to impute to those
individuals any further opinions beyond what is necessary to extend their credences to the
full set F . The second reason is the duty of scientific authors to their audience. Now, I don’t
think it is the duty of each scientist not to form opinions beyond what is strictly implied by
their evidence. Over years of training and experience in their field, scientists gain an ability
to form opinions on the basis of the evidence that sometimes seems to go beyond what the
non-expert might conclude, and yet which it is legitimate to report in a scientific publication
because of the expertise of the scientist. Nonetheless, when the scientist hasn’t formed any
opinion about a proposition and when we must nonetheless ascribe an opinion to them in
order to carry out the aggregation, we are obliged to make that opinion as conservative as
possible. In other words, deviations from a sort of Cliffordian conservatism about opinion
are permitted, but only when they are made explicitly by the scientist, and not when they
are made by a textbook author or lead author on a paper who is filling in the gaps in another
scientist’s opinions.
Why is conservatism the appropriate norm in the legal case? Here, I think the key lies
in the legal notion of the ‘reasonable person’. Often this abstract individual is invoked to
personify a certain standard of proof that is required in order to find a defendant liable
or guilty. On the websites of many US police departments, you will find a definition of
‘probable cause’ in terms of what a ‘reasonable person’ would believe on the basis of the
evidence in hand. But it is also used to determine when a defendant’s actions are reasonable.
For instance, in Brown vs. Kendall, Chief Justice Shaw determined that the ‘ordinary care’
that is necessary for the defendant to avoid liability is “that kind and degree of care, which
prudent and cautious men would use”.5 And in Commonwealth vs. Horsfall, Chief Justice
Rugg declared that “every traveller upon a highway is bound to exercise the care of the
ordinarily prudent and cautious person under all circumstances”.6 In both of these cases, we
see that the ‘reasonable person’ is identified with the ‘prudent and cautious person’. In the
cases cited, the prudence and caution relate to the individual’s practical choices about their
actions; but it seems reasonable to infer that the same condition is placed on the individual’s
beliefs. Take the case of Commonwealth vs. Horsfall, where a car on a public highway hit an
5Brown vs. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850).
6Commonwealth vs. Horsfall, 213 Mass. 232 (1913).
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individual, who then died from their injuries. The individual who was killed was stationary,
and the driver had seen them from some distance off and sounded their horn. While there
was plenty of room to pass, the driver didn’t take it, presumably thinking that the person
would move out of the way at the sound of the horn. Even if it might have been rationally
permissible to have a high credence that the person would move out of the way, given the
driver’s evidence, if that high credence is unusually high or incautious or unreasonable, it
seems that its rationality would not exculpate them. Rather, when they are assessed for
liability, their action is assessed from the point of view of a person who is cautious in both
their beliefs and the actions they perform on the basis of those beliefs.
Now let me explain how we might respect these conservative norms formally. If we wish
to extend a credence function in the most conservative way possible, it’s natural to appeal to
the Principle of Maximum Entropy. Typically, that principle applies to an individual whose
evidence constrains their credences to some extent, but still permits a range of different
credence functions. It is then used to pick out a single credence function from among those:
it picks the one that has maximal Shannon entropy.7 The idea is this: Shannon entropy
measures how unopinionated a probability distribution is. The higher its entropy, the less
opinionated it is. Thus, a uniform distribution over a finite partition, which is maximally
unopinionated, receives the highest entropy among probability functions over that partition,
while a probability function that places all of its mass on a single possible world, and is
therefore maximally opinionated, receives the lowest entropy. The idea is that your credence
function should respect your evidence; but among credence functions that do this, it should
be the least opinionated. In this sense, it should not go beyond the evidence; it should not
encode opinions that aren’t demanded by the evidence.
In our case, the situation is a little different. It is not only the individual’s evidence that
constrains how we might extend their credences to the propositions that lie in F but not in
Fi. It is also the credences that they assign to the propositions in Fi. So we might imagine
that each individual has their own body of evidence Ei, and we might model this as the set of
credence functions on F that respect that evidence. Thus, for instance, if among individual
i’s body of evidence is the fact that the coin in their pocket is fair, then each credence function
in Ei should assign credence 50% to that coin landing heads if tossed; and so on. Now, just
as we are supposing that all individuals have coherent credence functions, so we might
suppose that they all have credence functions that respect their evidence. Thus, for all i, Ri
and Ei overlap. Then we might say: when we extend individual i’s credence function from
Fi to F , we should ascribe the credence function PMEi , which is defined on F as follows:




• Ei is the set of credence functions on F that respect the evidence that individual i has;
• Ri is the set of coherent credence functions on F that extend Pi; and
• H(P) is the Shannon entropy of P.
The motivation is the same as in the standard application of maximal entropy reasoning,
where an individual’s credences are constrained only by their evidence, and we demand that
7It is typically used only when it is guaranteed that there will be just one such credence function.
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they pick among those that satisfy the constrains the one that is least opinionated. Similarly
here, where both the individual’s evidence and their existing credences impose constraints,
we ascribe to them the credence function among those that satisfies both constraints that is
least opinionated. Thus, we define





where ∆ is our favoured aggregation function for credence functions defined on the same
set of propositions—e.g., linear pooling (∆LP) or geometric pooling (∆GP).
Figure 3 illustrates the result of this process in the case we’ve considered before where:
• each individual has no evidence, so that E1 = E2 = PF ; and
• the propositions X, Y, and Z form a partition and the individuals’ credences are as
follows:
X Y Z
P1 0.8 − −
P2 − 0.8 −
Then
X Y Z
PME1 0.8 0.1 0.1
PME2 0.1 0.8 0.1
Then, if ∆LP is linear pooling, then
X Y Z
∆LPME∗(P1, P2) 0.45 0.45 0.1
It’s worth noting that, when we combine this with the illustration from above, we see that
taking the credence function that maximises entropy among all linear pools of the possible
extensions of P1 and P2 is not the same as taking the linear pool of the extensions of P1 and
P2 that maximise entropy. That is, ∆LPME(P1, P2) 6= ∆LPME∗(P1, P2). And, it seems to me at least,
the latter gives the more sensible result.
10 Conclusion
Often in philosophy, when we ask how we should do something, we must specify the pur-
pose for which we’re doing it. It turns out that this is true in the case of aggregating the
probabilistic judgments of individuals in a group when not all of those individuals assign
probabilities to the same propositions. In this paper, I ended up discussing two such pur-
poses. First, those cases in which you use the individuals in the group and the group it-
self as a sort of instrument or measuring device through which to gain information about
the world. In these cases, the solution is straightforward and a particular case of the more
general problem of determining the reading of an instrument when you don’t have full in-
formation about it. Second, those cases in which the group that the individuals constitute
plays an important role in some normative enterprise, such as the enterprise of science or as
a player whose liability for some harm you are assessing. In these cases, the solution is less
straightforward, but I argued that, in both of the sorts of cases mentioned, we are obliged to
extend the credences of each individual in the group in the more conservative way possible.
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X = (1, 0, 0) Y = (0, 1, 0)
Z = (0, 0, 1)
(0.8, 0.2, 0)
(0.8, 0, 0.2)







Figure 3: The barycentric plot of the simplex with (1, 0, 0) at bottom right, (0, 1, 0) at bottom
left, and (0, 0, 1) at the top.
11 Appendix: proofs
Proposition 1 If d is differentiable in its first argument, CAPd violates (DI).
Proof. Suppose W = {w1, w2} and F1 = {w1, w2} and F2 = {w2}. Then (DI) says that, for
any P1 defined on F1 and P2 defined on F2,
d(x, P1(w1)) + d(1− x, P1(w2)) + d(1− x, P2(w2))
is minimized as a function of x at x = p iff
d(x, P1(w1)) + d(1− x, P1(w2)) + d(x, P2(w1)) + d(1− x, 1− P2(w1))
is minimized as a function of x at x = p. Now, differentiate each with respect to x and
evaluate at p, where it will take value 0:[
d
dx
d(x, P1(w1)) + d(1− x, P1(w2)) + d(1− x, P2(w2))
]
(p) =




d(x, P1(w1)) + d(1− x, P1(w2)) + d(x, P2(w1)) + d(1− x, P2(w2))
]
(p) =
d′(p, P1(w1))− d′(1− p, P1(w2)) + d′(p, P2(w1))− d′(1− p, P2(w1)) = 0
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But subtracting the first from the second, we get:
d′(p, P2(w1)) = 0
But, since d is a divergence, d(x, P2(w1)) is minimized, as a function of x, uniquely at x =
P2(w1). So p = P2(w1). But by similar reasoning, we can also establish:
d′(p, P1(w1)) = 0
So it is minimized at p = P1(w1). But if P1(w1) 6= P2(w1), then this gives a contradiction.
Theorem 4 is a corollary of this:
Theorem 5. Suppose f1, . . . , fm, g1, . . . , gm are linear functions in n variables. That is, for each
1 ≤ j ≤ m, there are αj1, . . . , αjn, β j1, . . . , β jn such that
f j(x1, . . . , xn) = αj1x1 + . . . + αjnxn + k j
and
gj(x1, . . . , xn) = β j1x1 + . . . + β jnxn + lj
And suppose x = x1, . . . , xn minimizes
∑
j
( f j(x)− f j(p))2 + ∑
j
( f j(x)− f j(q))2 + ∑
j
(gj(x)− gj(p))2 (1)
and y = y1, . . . , yn minimizes
∑
j
( f j(y)− f j(p))2 + ∑
j
( f j(y)− f j(q))2 + ∑
j
(gj(y)− gj(q))2 (2)
Then, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let zi = xi+yi2 . Then z = z1, . . . , zn minimizes
∑
j
( f j(x)− f j(p))2 + ∑
j
( f j(x)− f j(q))2 + ∑
j
(gj(x)− gj(p))2 + ∑
j
(gj(x)− gj(p))2 (3)
























β ji(xi − pi)
)
= 0




























Now, it’s easy to check that, if we let zi =
pi+qi
2 , then z minimizes (3). So now we need only
show that xi+yi2 =
pi+qi












































































β ji(qi − yi)
)
= 0
Since y minimizes (2). So x∗ minimizes (1). So x∗ = x, and xi = x∗i = pi + qi − yi, as
required.
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